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KEEPING CONFIDENCE WITH FORMER
EMPLOYEES: CALIFORNIA COURTS APPLY THE
INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE TO
CALIFORNIA TRADE SECRET LAW
Benjamin A. Emmert*
I. INTRODUCTION
California's adoption of the Uniform Trade Secret Act
("UTSA"), know as the California Trade Secret Act ("CTSA"),
like trade secret laws of other states, sets an ethical standard
for behavior between businesses in the commercial arena.' It
represents the efforts of the legislature and the courts to en-
courage innovation while simultaneously enforcing a code of
moral conduct between businesses, employees, and third par-
ties.2 The CTSA lays the foundation for this two-fold objective
by securing the right to exploit the commercial value in confi-
dential information in the party who developed the informa-
tion.3 However, in the context of a trade secret misappropria-
tion action, a majority of courts in California curtail the
realization of these goals by requiring the trade secret owner
prove its trade secret information has actually been taken in
order to prove a misappropriation.4 As a result, the trade se-
cret owner is confronted with a problem of preventing the
misappropriation of its trade secret information when such
information is taken in an intangible form such as in the
memory of a departing employee.
* Technical Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 40. J.D. candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A., University of California, San Diego.
1. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3426-3426.11 (West 2000); Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481-82 (1974).
2. See Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 481-82.
3. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38 cmt. a (1993).
4. See Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120
(N.D. Cal. 1999).
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In Electro Optical Industries v. White the California
Court of Appeal for the Second District took steps to correct
this problem by expressly adopting the inevitable disclosure
doctrine.5 This trade secret doctrine allows a judge to con-
sider circumstantial evidence of a party's improper conduct
without proof of an accompanying actual misappropriation in
determining if a business's trade secrets are sufficiently
threatened to warrant issuing an injunction against a former
employee of the business.6 In essence, the inevitable disclo-
sure doctrine functions much like a party admission.7 It al-
lows an employer to present evidence of a former employee's
conduct to prove he or she will inevitably use the employer's
trade secret information in a subsequent employment.8
Although the Electro Optical court affirmed a lower
court's denial of an injunction,9 and has since been ordered
de-published by the California Supreme Court, ° the case
makes clear that "California courts will grant narrowly tai-
lored injunctions in appropriate circumstances to prevent a
former employee from performing certain tasks for a new em-
ployer to minimize the threat to a former employer's trade se-
crets."" The rationale behind the Electro Optical decision
flows from the historical 2 and policy' underpinnings of trade
secret law and follows the trend of a number of California's
superior courts that have employed the doctrine in unpub-
lished opinions for at least the last four years. 4 It also brings
California's enforcement of the CTSA in line with the trade
5. Electro Optical Indus., Inc. v. White, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680 (Ct. App.
1999), ordered not to be officially published by Electro Optical Indus., Inc. v.
White, 2000 Cal. LEXIS 3536 (Apr. 12, 2000).
6. See James Pooley, The Sky is Not Falling: When It Comes to Trade Se-
crets and Employee Mobility, a Little "Inevitable Disclosure" is Not Such a Bad
Thing, THE RECORDER, Nov. 1998, at S31 [hereinafter Pooley, The Sky is Not
Falling].
7. See CAL EVID. CODE § 1220 (West 1999).
8. See Pooley, The Sky is Not Falling, supra note 6, at S31.
9. See Electro Optical, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 686.
10. See Electro Optical Indus., Inc. v. White, 2000 Cal. LEXIS 3536 (Apr. 12
2000).
11. Gary E. Weiss & Sean A. Lincoln, Accepting the Inevitable: The Califor-
nia Court of Appeal Has Finally Adopted The Trade Secret Doctrine of "Inevita-
ble Disclosure," THE RECORDER, Feb. 2000, at S6 [hereinafter Weiss & Lincoln,
Accepting the Inevitable].
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Part II.B.
14. See id.
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secret laws of other jurisdictions 5 and the wording of the
UTSA. 16  However, the decision in Electro Optical, and
through it an employers ability to obtain an injunction pre-
venting an employee from assuming a new employment that
would threaten the confidential status of trade secret infor-
mation, without an accompanying actual misappropriation,
also underscores the inevitable disclosure doctrine's tension
with California's strong public policy of allowing employees to
change jobs freely.17
This comment focuses on the application of the inevitable
disclosure doctrine within the confines of California's trade
secret law. Part II of this comment is divided into eight sec-
tions. First, Part II.A reviews the historical origins of trade
secret law.'" Part II.B then discusses the policy underlying
trade secret law. 9 Next, Part II.C discusses elements of a
prima facie showing for trade secret protection,2" including
the proper subject matter for trade secret protection,21 the re-
quirement of confidentiality22 and the standard for obtaining
an injunction." Part II.D then discusses California's current
trade secret law24 and how this law is constrained by Califor-
nia Business and Profession Code section 16600.25 Finally,
Part II identifies the shortcomings of California trade secret
law absent the inevitable disclosure doctrine,26 the modern
origins of the doctrine,27 and California's adoption of the doc-
trine through the Electro Optical decision.2" Part III identi-
fies the arguments in favor of continued recognition of the in-
evitable disclosure doctrine and asks whether the doctrine
should become a permanent part of California's trade secret
15. See Terrence P. McMahon et al., Inevitable Disclosure: Not So Sure in
the West, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, May 12, 1997, at C35.
16. See infra Part II.C.2.
17. See John H. Matheson, Employee Beware: The Irreparable Damage of
the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 145 (1998).
18. See infra Part II.A.
19. See infra Part II.B.
20. See infra Part HI.C.
21. See infra Part II.C.l.a., II.C.l.b.
22. See infra Part II.C.2.
23. See infra Part II.C.3.
24. See infra Part II.D.
25. See infra Part II.E.
26. See infra Part II.F.
27. See infra Part I.G.
28. See infra Part II.H.
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law.29 Part IV analyzes the application of the inevitable dis-
closure doctrine under California's trade secret law."° Specifi-
cally, it identifies the function of the doctrine"1 and then com-
pares it to California's trade secret law as currently applied 2
and to California's public policy of worker mobility.3 Finally,
Part V concludes that the inevitable disclosure doctrine is
consistent with California's trade secret law, and proposes
that a court should make a more clear statement of the doc-
trine's requirements."
II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Development of Trade Secret Law
American trade secret laws originated in England in the
early nineteenth century during that country's industrial
revolution." These early English trade secret cases re-
sponded to the growing concerns of business and industry re-
garding thefts of medicinal recipes, 6 breaches in em-
ployer/employee relationships," and misuse of information
acquired through licensing agreements.38  From its begin-
nings, trade secret law only protected information that was
both not publicly known and held in confidence. 39 Addition-
ally, trade secret laws in England only protected against the
unauthorized disclosure of such confidential information."
These laws did not protect against disclosures not involving a
breach of confidence, such as independent discovery or disclo-
sures by parties not in a contractual relationship with the
trade secret owner.' Nor did early trade secret law protect
against the disclosure of information that, although not pub-
29. See infra Part III.
30. See infra Part IV.
31. See infra Part IV.A.
32. See infra Part IV.B.1.
33. See infra Part IV.B.2.
34. See infra Parts V-VI.
35. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. a (1993).
36. See Newbery v. James, 35 Eng. Rep. 1011 (Ch. 1817).
37. See Yovett v. Winyard, 37 Eng. Rep. 425 (Ch. 1820).
38. See Morison v. Moat, 68 Eng. Rep. 492 (Ch. 1851).
39. See MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRET LAW § 1.03 (1998).
40. See Lamb v. Evans, 3 Ch. 462 (1892); Morrison, 68 Eng. Rep. at 492;
Green v. Folgham, 57 Eng. Rep. 159 (Ch. 1823); Yovett, 37 Eng. Rep. at 425.
41. See Lamb, 3 Ch. at 462; Morrison, 68 Eng. Rep. at 492; Green, 57 Eng.
Rep. at 159; Yovett, 37 Eng. Rep. at 425.
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licly known, was commonly known within an industry."2
The early state courts and legislatures in the United
States recognized the importance of protecting confidential
information" and used the English decisions as guidelines for
developing their own trade secret laws." Like their early
English counterparts, trade secret laws in the United States
only protected information held in confidence." If a court
found that information was intended to be confidential and
that the claimant took reasonable steps to kept it secret, 6 a
court could grant an injunction4 1 to prevent employees or
other parties 8 in expressed or implied confidential relation-
ships 9 from disclosing the information. ° As United States
trade secret law developed, it began to diverge from its Eng-
lish roots. State courts began to regard employees as agents
of their employers and thus prohibited employees from using
42. See Badische Aniline und Soda Fabrik v. Schott, Segner & Co., 3 Ch.
447, 453 (1892).
43. See Fowle v. Park, 131 U.S. 88, 97 (1889).
44. See Vickey v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523 (1837); Melvin Jager described the
Vickey case as:
The first reported case involving trade secrets in the America is the
1837 decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Vickey v.
Welch.... The only authority cited and relied upon by the court in
Vickey was the early English Case of Bryson v. Whitehead. The Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court thereby imported the English common law
concept of protection for trade secrets into the common law of the
United States.
JAGER, supra note 39, § 2.02.
45. See Taylor v. Blanchard, 98 Mass. 452 (1866).
46. See Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 461 (1868); see also Kaumagraph
Co. v. Stampagraph Co., 138 N.E. 485 (N.Y. 1923); Pressed Steel Car Co. v.
Standard Steel Car Co., 60 A. 4 (Pa. 1904).
47. "It is quite clear that, independently of any question as to the right at
law, the court of chancery always had an original and independent jurisdiction
to prevent what that court considered and treated as wrong ... ." Pressed Steel
Car Co., 60 A. at 10. "Equity always protects against the unwarranted disclo-
sure and unconscionable use of trade secrets and confidential business commu-
nications." Empire Steam Laundry, Corp. v. Lozier, 165 Cal. 95, 99 (1913).
48. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100
(1917); see also Empire Steam Laundry, 165 Cal. at 95 (finding a common law
duty in the employment relationship that prohibits an employee from divulging
or using confidential information of the employer).
49. See 0. & W. Thum Co. v. Tloczynski, 72 N.W. 140, 143 (Mich. 1897)
(holding that an agreement not to disclose can be implied when the employer
has taken all reasonable steps to keep information secret and the defendant is
aware of the confidential nature of the information).
50. See E.I DuPont de Nemours, 244 U.S. at 103 (enjoining defendant from
disclosing plaintiffs confidential information).
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their employers' confidential information to compete with
their former employer, even in the absence of a written
agreement."
This developing American common law of trade secrets
was first articulated in a single comprehensive digest in 1939
when the American Law Institute ("ALI") published the Re-
statement (First) of Torts. 52 This publication synthesized
common law with the court decisions of the day to provide a
uniform definition of trade secret law.5" The Restatement de-
fined the required degree of secrecy a company must use to
protect its confidential information54 as well as what consti-
tutes the improper acquisition of confidential information. 5
Additionally, the Restatement protected the "innocent in-
fringer"-a party who acquires confidential information prior
to receiving notice of its trade secret status. Although the
Restatement has been largely replaced by more recent state-
ments of trade secret law, courts still use its basic text for
guidance in modern cases."
As business operations became more sophisticated, short-
comings in the Restatement (First) of Torts became appar-
ent.5 ' For example, the Restatement failed to extend trade
secret protection to confidential information relating to a sin-
gle event, or information that had a short life span, such as a
51. See Eastman Co. v. Reichenbach, 20 N.Y.S. 110, 115-16 (1892).
52. See JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 2.02[1] (1998) [hereinafter
POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS]. "The first major effort at synthesis of the developing
U.S. law of trade secrets was the Restatement of Torts." Id.
53. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
54. "[A] substantial element of secrecy must exist, so that, except by the use
of improper means, there would be difficulty in acquiring the information." Id.
55. See id. at cmt. g.
Liability under the rule stated in this section is based not on the actor's
purpose to discover another's trade secret but on the nature of the con-
duct by which the discovery is made. The actor is free to engage in any
proper conduct for the very purpose of discovering the secret. So long
as his conduct is proper, his purpose does not subject him to liability.
Id.
56. Id. at § 759 (declaring that an innocent acquirer of confidential informa-
tion was not liable even after he received notice of the confidential status of the
information if he was a bona fide purchaser for value, or had changed his posi-
tion in reliance on use of the secret, so that imposition of liability would be in-
equitable).
57. See, e.g., Optic Graphics, Inc. v. Agee, 591 A.2d 578, 585 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1991).
58. See POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS, supra note 52, § 2.03[1].
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contract for sale or a marketing plan. 9 Further, it gave no
protection to negative information-information that showed
what type of action will not work 6 -and failed to provide a
separate remedy for the improper acquisition of another's
trade secret.6 Finally, significant disagreement developed
between state courts regarding how to interpret the Restate-
ment in a misappropriation action.62
Responding to these shortcomings, the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Law passed the Uni-
form Trade Secrets Act in 1979 to supplement the Restate-
ment (First) of Torts.63 The UTSA updated trade secret law
by removing the Restatement's most significant limitations.64
The UTSA eliminated the Restatement's prohibition on trade
secret protection for single- or short-term information,6 and
included protection for negative information.6 6 Currently, the
UTSA provides the basis for trade secret laws in forty-two
states and the District of Columbia.67
In 1995, the ALI realized that business practices had
changed significantly since the publication of the Restate-
ment (First) of Torts.68 Trade secret law had evolved from a
simple articulation of a standard of commercial morality into
an important tool for encouraging investment in research and
development.6 9 Modern research and development practices
required disseminating confidential information to a broader
group of employees, agents, and licensees who could assist in
exploiting the information." The ALI concluded that to ade-
quately protect these new practices, trade secret protection
should be extended to any action that would violate the equi-
59. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b.
60. See UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT § 1(4) cmt., 14 U.L.A. 439 (1990).
61. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 759.
62. See POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS, supra note 52, § 2.03[1].
63. UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT § 1(4).
64. See id. at cmt.
65. See id. § 1(4); Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.,
350 F.2d 134, 144 (9th Cir. 1965).
66. See UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT § 1(4) cmt.
67. See CAL. CIV. CODE D.4, Pt. 1, T.5 Ref & Annos (West 1997 & Supp.
2000).
68. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. a (1993).
69. See id.
70. See Peng S. Chan & Dorothy Heide, Strategic Alliances in Technology:
Key Competitive Weapon, 58 SAM ADVANCED MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, No. 4,
Sept. 22, 1993, at 9, available in LEXIS, News Group File, Beyond Two Years.
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table theory of unjust enrichment. 71 The ALI developed the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition to meet this objec-
tive.2 In adopting the UTSA's definition of a trade secret and
adopting a more expansive foundation, the Restatement(Third) of Unfair Competition provides the most inclusive
trade secret protection to date.73
B. Policy of Trade Secret Protection
The ability of trade secret law to adapt to the changing
commercial environment stems from its strong policy under-
pinnings.74 Trade secret laws exist to prescribe and maintain
standards of commercial ethics, and to encourage business
investment.7 ' These laws are designed to allow both indi-
viduals and businesses to secure the rights to their work
product by providing an economical, timely, and flexible
framework of legal protection.6
While the overarching policy of trade secret law can be
succinctly stated, applying it to achieve these goals requires
balancing three distinct but equally compelling interests.
First, businesses and investors have an interest in protecting
their investments in proprietary information. 8 Businesses
invest in new products and services if they believe a competi-
tor will not be able to legally copy their efforts." Without
adequate legal protection, business would have to devote
more resources to protecting what they currently have and
less to developing new products and services. ° Further, joint
development projects and strategic partnerships where confi-
dential information is shared between businesses become less
attractive in the absence of trade secret assurances of confi-
dentiality because trust between participants is diminished."
71. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38, cmt. b.
72. See id. cmt. a.
73. See id. § 39, cmt. a.
74. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 492 (1973).
75. See id. at 482.
76. See Fowle v. Park, 131 U.S. 88, 89 (1889).
77. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. b.
78. See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180
(7th Cir. 1991).
79. See Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 492; Fowle, 131 U.S. at 98.
80. See Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 485-86.
81. See Brenda Sandburg, When Strategic Alliance Leads to the Courthouse:
A Trade Secrets Suit Against H-P Shows the Fine Line Between Cooperation and
Competition, THE RECORDER, Nov. 1998, at S21; see also Charles T.C. Compton,
1178 [Vol. 40
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Second, trade secret law factors in the rights and inter-
ests of individual employees to market their skills in the most
effective manner possible.82 Just like the modern business
environment, the market for qualified employees is also ex-
tremely competitive.83 Today, individuals are less likely to
work for one employer for their entire career than they were
in the past.84 As individuals gain experience and skill, their
value to an employer increases.85 Unrestricted employee
movement allows individuals to market their skills to several
different employers, effectively selling their services to the
highest bidder. 6 Thus, individuals are encouraged and re-
warded for seeking to improve their talents and acquire new
skills during their employment.87
Finally, trade secret law considers the interests of the
public at large.8 Trade secret law protects the public's inter-
est in having the greatest variety and the highest quality of
goods and services available.88 This public interest is best
served by having at least a minimal level of information ex-
change between businesses, often referred to as "informa-
tional leakage." ° Proponents of the value of "informational
leakage" point to California's Silicon Valley as support for
their position.91 As an example, the lineage of the majority of
semiconductor firms in the Silicon Valley originated with
former employees of a common parent, Fairchild Semiconduc-
Cooperation, Collaboration, and Coalition: A Perspective on the Types and Pur-
poses of Technology Joint Ventures, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 861 (1993); Chan &
Heide, supra note 70, at 9.
82. See CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842, 852 (1st Cir. 1985) ("It is
also 'well settled that an employee upon terminating his employment may carry
away and use the general skill or knowledge acquired during the course of the
employment."').
83. See Matheson, supra note 17.
84. See Morgan Chu & Gail Standish, When Secrets Walk: Reining In
"Threatened Misappropriation," THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGIST,
May 1996, at 1.
85. See Matheson, supra note 17.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See James Pooley, Better Protection For Trade Secrets, 5 CAL. LAW. 51
(1985) [hereinafter Pooley, Better Protection for Trade Secrets].
89. See Brunswick Corp. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 404 N.E.2d 205, 207
(Ill. 1980).
90. See Pooley, The Sky is Not Falling, supra note 6, at S31.
91. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology In-
dustrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants not to Compete, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999).
1179
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
tor. 92 Additionally, the development of the laser printer,
Ethernet, graphical user interface and the computer mouse
are all largely credited to the "informational leakage" that oc-
curred at Xerox PARC in Silicon Valley." It is these three in-
dependent yet equally important interests that trade secret
law attempts to balance while still providing a fair yet flexi-
ble system of legal protection.
C. Obtaining Trade Secret Protection
Even with the strong policy underpinnings, trade secret
law does not automatically protect information simply be-
cause an individual claims information as a trade secret.94
Under the UTSA,95 three requirements must be met before a
court will protect information from unauthorized disclosure."
First, the UTSA requires that the confidential information be
both the proper subject matter for trade secret protection and
subject to reasonable security precautions to prevent its in-
tentional or inadvertent disclosure." Second, the confidential
information must have been either actually or threatened to
be misappropriated." Third, the evidence of misappropriation
must be clear and the harm immediate before the trade secret
owner is entitled to relief.9
1. Proper Subject Matter and Reasonable Precautions
Required by the UTSA to Prevent the Inadvertant
Disclosure of Trade Secret Information
a. Subject Matter for Trade Secret Protection Under
the UTSA
The UTSA requires the owner of confidential information
first prove that the information is the proper subject matter
92. See ANNA LEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE 25 (1994).
93. See MICHAEL HILTZIK, DEALERS OF LIGHTNING (1999).
94. UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990); AMP, Inc. v.
Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1202 (7th Cir. 1987).
95. The requirements under the UTSA are used here because the UTSA
serves as the basis for the majority of state trade secret laws and the Restate-
ment (Third) of Unfair Competition.
96. See UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT § 1.
97. See id. § 1(4).
98. See id. § 1(2).
99. See Tubular Threading, Inc. v. Scandaliato, 443 So. 2d 712, 715 (La. Ct.
App. 1983).
1180 [Vol. 40
2000] KEEPING EMPLOYEE CONFIDENCE 1181
for trade secret protection before an action for misappropria-
tion of such information can be heard.' ° The UTSA defines a
trade secret as
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or poten-
tial, from not being generally known to, and not being
readily ascertainable by proper means by other persons
who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use,
and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under
the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.101
The UTSA's drafters started with the definition of a trade
secret in the Restatement (First) of Torts..2 and altered it to
provide more effective trade secret protection in the current
business environment.' The UTSA eliminated the Restate-
ment's requirement that the confidential information be "con-
tinuously used in one's business"' ° to qualify for trade secret
protection.' Eliminating this requirement had two direct
benefits. First, it allowed trade secret protection for informa-
100. See Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 892
(Minn. 1983).
101. UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT § 1(4).
102. The Restatement's definition reads as follows:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compila-
tion of information which is used in one's business, and which gives
him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not
know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process
of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a ma-
chine or other device, or a list of customers... Generally it relates to
the production of goods, as, for example, a machine or formula for the
production of an article. It may however relate to the sale of goods or
to other operations in the business, such as a code for determining dis-
counts, rebates or other concessions in a price list or catalogue, or a list
of specialize customers, or a method of bookkeeping or other office
management.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
103. See UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT § 1(4) cmt.
104. Trade secret information
differs from other secret information in a business in that is not simply
information as to single or ephemeral events in the conduct of the busi-
ness, as, for example, the amount or other terms of a secret bid for a
contract of the salary of certain employees, or the security investments
made or contemplated, or the date fixed for the announcement of a new
policy or for bringing out a new model or the like. A trade secret is a
process or device for continuous use in the operations of the business.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b.
105. See UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT § 1(4) cmt.
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tion related to a specific event, ' such as a contract for sale, a
marketing plan, and it provided protection for negative in-
formation. This type of information that by its very nature is
not continuously used in a business could now be protected."°7
Second, it allowed trade secret protection for a business that
possessed valuable information but had not acquired the
means to utilize such information. 10 8
The UTSA's trade secret definition provides protection
for virtually all types of information held in confidence." 9 It
expanded the scope of protectable subject matter to include
both specific information-such as business plans or technical
information-and more general information-commonly
termed "know-how."10 Further, the UTSA does not require
that information be the exclusive property of the party
claiming trade secret protection.' Different competitors may
each protect the same information as a trade secret from
those who have yet to discover it."' Finally, There is no re-
quirement that the information be incorporated or embodied
in a tangible form if the trade secret owner otherwise suffi-
ciently delineates what information he or she is trying to pro-
tect."1 3 However, the UTSA does not protect information that
is readily ascertainable from sources not in a confidential re-
lationship with the owner."'
The UTSA's definition of trade secret information focuses
on the value of the information to the owner, rather than the




109. See US West Communications, Inc. v. Office of Consumer Advocate, 498
N.W.2d, 711, 714 (Iowa 1993).
110. See UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT § 1(4).
111. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
112. See id.
113. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. d (1993);
see also infra part III.B.l.a.
114. See UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT § 1(4)(i). The definition of "trade secret" is
limited to information "not... readily ascertainable by proper means." Id. The
Act defines "improper means" to include "theft, bribery, misrepresentation,
breach or inducement of a breach of duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage
through electronic or other means." Id. § 1(1). The official comment to the sec-
tion lists a variety of "proper means," including discovery by independent inven-
tion, reverse engineering, and observation of the item in public use. Id. at cmt.
115. See id. § 1(4)(i) (defining "trade secret" as information that "derives in-
dependent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known
1182 [Vol. 40
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drafters recognized that as competition in the commercial en-
vironment and the cost of research and development within
an industry increase, businesses may increasingly hoard
valuable information that they might not have the ability to
exploit themselves, rather than risk losing any rights they
may have to the information by disclosing it to others who
could assist in putting the information to productive use.116
The UTSA's focus on the value of information counters this
tendency to hoard valuable information by giving businesses
a greater degree of certainty as to what information can be
protected."7
Although the UTSA's trade secret definition embodies the
current trade secret law of a majority of states,'18 it has aug-
mented rather than replaced the common law and Restate-
ment (First) of Torts articulations of trade secret law." 9 Both
definitions of a trade secret taken from the Restatement
20
and the case law developed through the common law 2' are
still instructive to the extent they do not conflict with the
UTSA. '
2
Information protectable as a trade secret has always been
distinguished from information classified as general skill and
knowledge acquired by employees during the course of their
employment.' 2' Trade secret information is protected from
to... other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use").
116. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
117. See Gary E. Weiss, A California Employer's Guide to Protecting Against
the Theft of Trade Secrets, Customers and Employees by Departing Employees,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UPDATE, No. 94-1, at 1 (Winter 1994-95).
118. See CAL. CIV. CODE D.4, Pt. 1, T.5 Ref & Annos (West 1997 & Supp.
2000).
119. See Minuteman, Inc. v. Alexander, 434 N.W.2d 773, 777 (Wis. 1989);
Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 898 (Minn.
1983).
120. See supra note 103.
121. One formulation extracted from the early English cases defined trade
secret as information that
1) is secret either in the absolute or relative sense; 2) has been inten-
tionally and demonstrably treated as a secret; 3) is capable of indus-
trial or commercial application; and 4) involves an interest of the pos-
sessor, generally and economic interest, worthy of protection under
established principles of equity.
JAGER, supra note 40, § 2.01. In addition, these courts required some type of
contractual, or quasi-contractual, relationship between the parties. See id.
122. See Minuteman, Inc., 434 N.W.2d at 777; Electro-Craft Corp., 332
N.W.2d at 898.
123. See AMP, Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1205 (7th Cir. 1987)
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disclosure, while information that forms the general skill,
knowledge, training, and experience of an employee is not.12 4
Distinguishing between protectable and non-protectable in-
formation is critical to trade secret law. 125 Courts, employers,
and employees have all struggled to define this protect-
able/non-protectable distinction, yet no established demarca-
tion exists.126 However, relevant considerations include the
uniqueness of the information to the business,'27 whether
competitors have failed in their efforts to duplicate the infor-
mation;'28 and whether the information is contained in physi-
cal documents retained by the departing employee.'29
b. Required Secrecy for Trade Secret Protection
Under the UTSA
In order to qualify for trade secret protection, information
must also be properly protected from inadvertent or unau-
thorized disclosure.3 ° The issue of accessibility of information
to the public is an essential characteristic of a trade secret'
and as such is a threshold question in every case."' Trade se-
cret law requires that an owner constantly protect his or her
confidential information because upon releasing it into the
public domain, the public's interest in free dissemination of
information, the employee's interest in unrestricted mobility,
and other businesses' interests in competition all preempt the
trade secret owner's interest."'
(citing MBL (USA) Corp. v. Diekman, 445 N.E.2d 418, 424 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)
(stating that general skill and knowledge are "things an employee is free to take
and to use in later pursuits, especially if they do not take the form of written
records, compilations or analysis")).
124. See id.
125. James Pooley, Property or Confidentiality? Policy Poles Conflict, THE
NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Jan. 26, 1998, at C24 [hereinafter Pooley, Property or
Confidentiality?].
126. See POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS, supra note 52, § 2.03[7].
127. See GTI Corp. v. Calhoon, 309 F. Supp. 762, 770-72 (S.D. Ohio 1969).
128. See Head Ski Co., Inc. v. Kam Ski Co. Inc., 158 F. Supp. 919, 923-24 (D.
Md. 1958).
129. AMP, Inc., 823 F.2d at 1204-05).
130. See UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT § 1(4)(ii), 14 U.L.A. 439 (1990).
131. See Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 282 N.E.2d 921, 925 (Mass.
1972).
132. See JAGER, supra note 39, § 5.0511] (citing Woven Elecs. Corp. v. Ad-
vance Group, Inc., 930 F.2d 913, 916 (4th Cir. 1991); Selection Research, Inc. v.
Murman, 433 N.W.2d 526, 532 (Neb. 1989); Microbiological Research Corp. v.
Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 696 (Utah 1981)).
133. See Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 435 (Pa. 1960).
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Trade secret law places the burden of protecting the con-
fidential status of information on the trade secret owners, in
part because, the owners are in a superior position to identify
and protect their rights.' It would be both unworkable and
unreasonable to require a departing employee, new employer,
or recipient of information apparently legally obtained to re-
search the lineage of newly acquired information to ensure it
is not protected as a trade secret. 3' This requirement also as-
sists the trier of fact in a misappropriation action in deter-
mining if the information is properly subject to trade secret
protection, and if so, whether a misappropriation actually oc-
curred.'36
Initially, trade secret law did not definitively outline the
degree of secrecy required to protect information as a trade
secret." ' Some early court's required absolute secrecy, while
others held that secrecy was a matter of degree based on the
facts and circumstances of the case and the value of the in-
formation to the owner.'38 Over time, the majority view held
trade secret law does not require information to be kept ab-
solutely secret for protection. 9 Currently, a party claiming
trade secret protection must show it took "reasonable precau-
tions" under the circumstances to prevent the inadvertent
disclosure of the information.'4 °
The "reasonable precautions" standard requires that the
putative owner demonstrate an intent to keep the informa-
tion confidential' and adopted measures to prevent the in-
formation from passing into the public domain. 4' This is a
fact-based requirement,' that allows the fact finder to use
his or her common sense.' Information will not lose its
134. See Victoria A. Cundiff, How to Identify Your Trade Secrets in Litiga-
tion, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, & LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES 557, 559 (PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE 1999).
135. See id.
136. See id. at 560.
137. See K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co, Inc., 506 F.2d 471, 473 (9th Cir 1974).
138. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. g (1993).
139. See Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc., 828 F.2d 452, 455 (8th Cir. 1987).
140. UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT § 1(4) cmt., 14 U.L.A. 439 (1990).
141. See Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Ground & Assocs., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 90-91
(Minn. 1979).
142. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 147
(1989).
143. See Granholz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 869 F.2d 390, 393 (8th Cir. 1989).
144. See L.M. Rabinowitz & Co., Inc. v. Dasher, 82 N.Y.S.2d 431, 439 (N.Y.
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status as a trade secret simply because the holder fails to
take every conceivable step to keep the information confiden-
tial.'45 In practice the secrecy requirement operates on a con-
tinuum: the more critical or important the information, the
greater the required showing of confidentiality for trade se-
cret protection.'46
Precautionary measures that demonstrate a trade secret
owner's reasonable precautions to keep information confiden-
tial include the following: requiring employees to sign confi-
dentiality agreements,' 4 notifying employees of what infor-
mation is restricted,' 48 using non-disclosure agreements for
both employees and non-employees, '" restricting access to
sensitive information by requiring passwords, 5 ' retaining
control over the distribution of documents containing trade
secret information,' and conducting entrance and exit inter-
views of employees.'52
Additionally, the conduct of a defendant in a misappro-
priation action also demonstrates whether information has
been sufficiently protected as a trade secret."3 For example,
the fact that a defendant submitted to the security measures
of an employer and signed a confidentiality or non-disclosure
agreement during their employment, while not determina-
tive, is strong evidence of the confidential status of the infor-
mation."4
The "reasonable precautions" standard for protecting in-
formation gives the trade secret owner an important right
that is essential to modern business. This standard allows
the owner of the information to make a limited disclosure of
Sup. Ct. 1948) (finding that prior to employment with plaintiff, defendant did
not have the ability to make the infringing device).
145. See Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 664 (4th Cir.
1993).
146. See Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., Inc., 378 F. Supp. 806, 813-814
(E.D. Pa. 1974).
147. See Avnet Inc. v. Wyle Lab., Inc., 437 S.E.2d 302, 305-06 (Ga. 1993).
148. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 521 (9th Cir.
1992).
149. See Trandes Corp., 996 F.2d at 664.
150. See Id.
151. See Id.
152. See JAGER, supra note 39, § 5.05[2] [c] [viii].
153. See Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp. v. Cox, 50 N.Y.S.2d 643, 650
(1944).
154. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41 cmt. b (1993).
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the confidential information without losing the information to
the public domain.'55 For example, the owner may divulge
trade secret information to another party under express or
implied confidentiality agreements without losing the ability
to prevent further dissemination of the information."' This
right enables the owner of a trade secret to entrust signifi-
cantly more information to their employees or enter into joint
venture/development agreements with other businesses. 7
2. Showing a Misappropriation of Trade Secrets Under
the UTSA
After establishing that a trade secret exists, the party
claiming trade secret protection must also show that the in-
formation was either actually misappropriated or has been
threatened to be misappropriated."' However, courts in mis-
appropriation actions often do not distinguish between an ac-
tual and a threatened misappropriation."' In both instances
courts generally require that the trade secret holder prove an
actual misappropriation by direct evidence. 6' This require-
ment appears to limit actions for a threatened misappropria-
tion of trade secrets to situations where trade secret informa-
tion has already been taken, and its wrongful possession
constitutes a threat of further dissemination.''
Still, under trade secret law as it is written, a misappro-
priation of trade secret information exists if the information
has been, or has been threatened to be, used in any fashion
for the benefit of the infringer, or used in a way that will
harm the owner irrespective of whether the information has
been taken in a tangible or intangible form.' Since both the
scope and policy of trade secret law has expanded, 63 the spec-
trum of activities that constitute a misappropriation is only
155. See UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT § 1(2)(i), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990); see also
Kamin v. Kuhnau, 374 P.2d 912, 919 (Or. 1962).
156. See id.
157. See POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS, supra note 52, § 6.03.
158. See UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT § 2(a).
159. Compare Surgidev Corp., v. Eye Tech., Inc., 648 F. Supp. 661 (D. Minn.
1986), with Gach v. Franolich, 525 A.2d 525 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987).
160. See Gach, 525 A.2d at 525.
161. See Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120
(N.D. Cal. 1999).
162. See UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT § 2.
163. See supra Parts II.A., II.B.
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limited by the distinction between proper and improper com-
petition.'64 Thus, courts are not limited to finding a misap-
propriation in situations where the infringing party obtains
the trade secret information through traditional improper ac-
tions such as "theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or in-
ducement of a breach of duty to maintain secrecy, or espio-
nage through electronic or other means."65 Rather, modern
courts evaluate all the circumstances surrounding the acqui-
sition of the information to determine if a party used im-
proper means to acquire it. 6
The classic example of the use of improper means to ob-
tain trade secret information occurred in E.1 duPont de Ne-
mours & Co. v. Christopher.'67 In that case, the court found
that the defendant's aerial photographs of a competitor's
manufacturing facility taken during its construction, al-
though otherwise lawful, was an improper misappropriation
of confidential information under the circumstances.168 The
defendant's actions were done for the sole purpose of discov-
ering the trade secrets of a competitor. 9 The court soundly
rejected the defendant's argument that the information was
in plain view, because of the impracticality of covering the
manufacturing facility during its construction. 170
Other traditional activities that courts have found im-
proper include, memorizing confidential information, 7' ob-
taining information using false pretenses, 172  searching
through a competitor's trash, 173 and hiring specific employees
for the purposes of gaining their employers' trade secrets. 4
Modern courts may prohibit any action where "the means of
acquisition are inconsistent with accepted principles of public
164. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. a (1993).
165. Id.
166. See E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016
(5th Cir. 1970).
167. Id. at 1012.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 1016-17.
171. See Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp. v. Cox, 50 N.Y.S.2d 643, 654
(1944).
172. See Continental Data Sys., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 638 F. Supp. 432 (E.D.
Pa. 1986).
173. See Tennant Co. v. Advance Mach. Co., 355 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984).
174. See Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 411 P.2d 921 (Cal. 1966).
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policy [of trade secret law] and [mitigated by] the extent to
which the acquisition was facilitated by the trade secret own-
ers failure to take reasonable precautions against discovery
by the means in question.'
175
A trade secret holder can also demonstrate a trade secret
misappropriation by proving a third party's wrongful use of
the information without showing it was improperly ac-
quired.176 This type of misappropriation often occurs in the
context of a joint venture or a similar situation. 17 The trade
secret owner must show that the information was transferred
during a confidential relationship 17 ' and the recipient knew
the nature of the relationship. 9 A confidential relationship
can be shown by an express agreement, a course of conduct
between the parties,' 6 or the type of transaction involved.'
After establishing the relationship, the trade secret owner
need only show that the recipient's use of the information ex-
ceeded that authorized by the relationship, or that the pos-
session of the information constitutes a threat of unauthor-
ized use.'82
3. Trade Secret Owner Entitlement to Injunctive Relief
Once the trade secret owner proves the existence of a pro-
tectable trade secret and that the information has either been
misappropriated or a misappropriation is threatened, the
owner must prove that he is entitled to an injunction.'83 Spe-
cifically, the trade secret holder's interest in protecting the in-
formation must outweigh any harm the injunction will cause
175. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 cmt. c (1993).
176. See Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1243 (9th Cir.
1972); see also Sandburg, supra note 82, at S21.
177. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
178. See Kamin v. Kuhnau, 374 P.2d 912 (Or. 1962).
179. See Faris v. Enberg, 158 Cal. Rptr. 704, 709 (Ct. App. 1985).
180. See Vantage Point, Inc. v. Parker Brothers, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1204,
1216 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). However, just as a course of conduct can show that the
information was meant to be confidential, it can also imply that the information
was not meant to be confidential. See Flotec, Inc. v. Southern Research, Inc., 16
F. Supp. 2d 992, 1007 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (finding no theft of trade secret where the
owner did not mark drawings confidential before giving them to a competitor,
made no oral declarations that plans were confidential, and did not require the
competitor to sign a confidentiality agreement).
181. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41 cmt. b (1993).
182. See id. § 40, cmt. c; UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT § 1(2)(ii), 14 U.L.A. 438
(1990).
183. See Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 735-36 (Ct. App. 1997).
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the defendant. '84 In balancing the interests of the trade secret
owner and the former employee, the court will consider the
likelihood of the plaintiffs success on the merits of the case,
the threat of irreparable harm to the plaintiff if the injunction
is not imposed, the relative apportionment of harm between
the parties, and the public's interest in the outcome of the
controversy."' These factors allow a court to balance the
three competing interests underlying trade secret law and is-
sue an injunction consistent with its policy.8
D. California's Adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
California adopted the UTSA as the basis for the CTSA,
which became effective in 1985.187 The California Legislature
passed the CTSA to clarify California's trade secret law,
which at the time seemed to lend support for almost any ab-
stract proposition in a misappropriation action.'88 The CTSA
followed the general guidelines and policies promulgated by
the UTSA for trade secret protection, but altered certain pro-
visions to conform with the policies of the state.88 For exam-
ple, the CTSA does not prohibit trade secret protection for in-
formation simply because such information is available from
public sources,' although such a claim can be raised as an af-
firmative defense.' Further, California does not excuse an
infringing party's actions simply because the infringing party
could have developed the information himself or herself. 2 If
a defendant acted improperly in acquiring confidential infor-
mation, California courts are likely to disregard the existence
of legal alternative to acquire the information and find a mis-
appropriation. 9




187. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3426 (West 1999).
188. See Pooley, Better Protection for Trade Secrets, supra note 88, at 51.
189. The CTSA does not follow the UTSA requirement that trade secret in-
formation not be readily ascertainable. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d)(1) (West
1999).
190. See Imi-Tech Corp. v. Gagliani, 691 F. Supp. 214, 231 (S.D. Cal. 1987).
191. See Pooley, Better Protection for Trade Secrets, supra note 88, at 51.
192. See Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 735-36 (Ct. App. 1997).
193. See Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1243 (9th Cir.
1972); JAGER, supra note 39, § CA.01 ("California punishes the wrongful acqui-
sition of information, even if it could have been obtained legally.").
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However, even with the liberal scope of the CTSA, Cali-
fornia courts will not find a misappropriation for every im-
proper acquisition or disclosure of confidential information.'
The CTSA requires that the trade secret owner prove that an
infringing party possesses the capabilities to benefit from
wrongfully acquired information.'95 But, if the recipient is ca-
pable of using the information, its mere possession may be
sufficient to establish liability, even without actual use.'9 6
E. California Business & Professions Code Section 16600
The CTSA's requirement that a trade secret infringer
have the ability to exploit the information is related to Cali-
fornia's broader public policy of relatively unrestricted worker
mobility, illustrated by section 16600 of the California Busi-
ness and Profession Code.'97 This section provides that "every
contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a
lawful profession, trade or business of any kind is to that ex-
tent void."'9 Essentially, this section prohibits enforcement of
"do-not-compete" covenants between parties that extend past
the termination of a formal relationship.'99 Such covenants
most commonly occur in the employee-employer context when
employees agree not to (1) work for a competitor for a period
of time, (2) work in specific industry, or (3) work in a geo-
graphical area after they leave their current employer. °°
California courts strictly interpret section 16600, upholding
such agreements in only a limited number of situations. 0 '
However, despite the broad interpretation of section
16600 it has never been interpreted as a per se prohibition on
194. See Gibson-Homans Co. v. Wall-Tite, Inc., No. 92-2750-JGD, 1992 WL
512411 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 1992).
195. See id.
196. See Morlife, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731.
197. CAL. BUs. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1999).
198. Pooley, The Sky is Not Falling, supra note 6, at S31.
199. See Scott v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1034, 1040-41 (N.D.
Cal. 1990).
200. See id. at 1042.
201. California does not follow a "rule of reason" in interpreting covenants
that restrain competition under section 16600. Furthermore, while California
courts may, in some circumstances, apply a "rule of reason" to partial restric-
tions on competition, they have not recognized geographical and temporal re-
strictions on competition as merely partial restrictions. Rather, California
courts do not give force to such situations. See id.
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all covenants not to compete." 2 California courts have fash-
ioned certain exceptions to section 16600's overarching rule to
prevent situations that amount to unfair competition."3 For
example, courts allow employers to prevent a departing em-
ployee from disclosing its trade secrets in subsequent em-
ployment.2 4 Further, a court may limit the tasks a former
employee may undertake in a new job, even in the absence of
threatened trade secret misappropriation.2"0 In addition,
courts may enforce restrictions contained in a license agree-
ment even after the termination of the agreement.2 6
F. California Law Prior to the Electro Optical Decision
Prior to Electro Optical in 1999, the California courts, at
least officially, followed the traditional requirements for
proving a misappropriation of trade secrets. The trade secret
owner had to prove that the alleged infringing party was in
wrongful possession of its trade secrets and also had the ca-
pabilities to exploit the information.2 7 The problems created
by California's traditional approach and the high financial
stakes in the debate over the inevitable disclosure doctrine
are best illustrated by the case of Advanced Micro Devices,
Inc. v. Hyundai Electronics America."'
Advanced Micro Devices ("AMD"), located in Santa Clara,
California,0 9 designs and manufactures computer microproc-
essors, related peripherals, memory, programmable logic de-
vices, and circuits for telecommunication and networking ap-
202. See id. at 1043.
203. See Monogram Indus., Inc. v. SAR Indus., Inc., 134 Cal. Rptr. 714, 718
(Ct. App. 1976).
204. See Scott, 732 F. Supp. at 1043 ("[If a former employee uses a former
employer's trade secrets or otherwise commits unfair competition, California
courts recognize a judicially created exception to section 16600 and will enforce
a restrictive covenant in such a case.").
205. See Campbell v. Stanford Univ., 817 F.2d 499, 502-03 (9th Cir. 1987).
206. See King v. Gerold, 240 P.2d 710, 712 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952).
207. See Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120(N.D. Cal. 1999). "Obtaining an injunction under a threatened misappropria-
tion claim has historically required a showing of an intent to disclose trade se-
crets. For example, the unauthorized removal of confidential documents by an
employee may be interpreted as an intent to misappropriate trade secrets."
Pascal W. DiFronzo, When Lips Aren't Sealed, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 8, 1996, at 46.
208. First Amended Complaint, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Hyundai
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plications."' In 1988, AMD announced its intention to enter
into the burgeoning market for a new type of computer mem-
ory called flash memory."' Flash memory was an emerging
market in the semiconductor industry and was expected to be
a high-growth market for the foreseeable future."2 Since
1991, AMD has spent over one billion dollars on the research
and development of their flash memory devices.213
As a result of its investment, AMD has become one of the
industry leaders in flash memory.2"4 In 1994, AMD had an es-
timated forty percent of the worldwide market for flash mem-215 it
ory, and its estimated revenue from the flash memory divi-
sion was $510 million in 1995 and $550 million in 1996.16 By
1996, flash memory had become AMD's major product line,
generating more revenue for the company than its microproc-
essor business.217 Some analysts predicted the market for
flash memory would continue to grow to over nine billion
dollars by the year 2000.28
AMD protected aspects of its flash memory products as a
trade secret, including, (1) the identification of key employees
on the project, (2) the design of its flash memory devices, (3)
the product's performance, and (4) marketing plans for flash
memory devices. 19 AMD instituted and followed security pre-
210. Id. 9.
211. Michael R. Leibowitz, Cash for Flash: A Challenge to Vendors of
EPROM Chips; Flash Technology Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory,
14 ELECTRONIC BUSINESS, at 18, Aug. 1, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Group
File, Beyond Two Years.
212. Hyundai Electronics America Announces Availability of Flash Memory
Card Products, BUSINESS WIRE, May 28, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Group
File, Beyond Two Years.
213. See First Amended Complaint supra note 209, 11.
214. See Ismini Scouras, Looking Forward and Backward-Analyzing the
Similarities and Differences Between DRAM and Flash Chips Provides Valuable
Market Insight, ELECTRONIC BUYERS' NEWS, Oct. 13, 1997, at E12.
215. See Hugh G. Willet, AMD Puts Muscle Behind Flash, ELECTRONIC
BUYERS' NEWS, Sept. 19, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Group File, Beyond
Two Years.
216. See Anthony Cataldo, AMD, Fujitsu Modify Agreement, ELECTRONIC
BUYERS' NEWS, Nov. 4, 1996, available in 1996 WL 12489766.
217. See Anthony Cataldo, Hyundai Proceeds, Despite AMD, ELECTRONIC
BUYERS' NEWS, May 13 1996, available in 1996 WL 9427423 [hereinafter
Cataldo, Hyundai Proceeds].
218. See James Carbone, Flash Tags Drop as Market Grows and Capacity is
Added; Electronic Flash Memory Chips, 4 PURCHASING, Vol. 123, Sept. 18, 1997,
at 53, available in LEXIS, Magazine Stories, Combined.
219. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 208, 12-15.
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cautions to prevent both the unauthorized or inadvertent dis-
closure of its confidential information."' These security pre-
cautions included requiring all AMD employees to sign confi-
dentiality agreements as a condition of their employment."'
These confidentiality agreements created a contractual duty
on the part of the employee not to disclose to any unauthor-
ized person, or use for any unauthorized purpose, AMD's con-
fidential information.222
In June 1995, Hyundai Electronics America ("Hyundai")
announced it was creating a flash memory division in Santa
Clara, California that would directly compete with estab-
lished manufactures of flash memory, including AMD.222
Hyundai announced they would bring their new flash mem-
ory products to market by the second half of 1996.224 Hyundai
hired a former director of product marketing for AMD's flash
memory division to head Hyundai's flash memory program. 5
Hyundai gave the former AMD employee "carte blanche" to
make Hyundai a "successful player" in the flash memory
market.226 Hyundai then began to hire other AMD employees
to staff its flash memory project.227
AMD believed that Hyundai was hiring its employees to
obtain AMD's flash memory trade secrets, save on the cost of
research and development, and get to market more quickly.28
220. See id. $ 19.
221. See id. 17.
222. See id. 1 18.
223. See Anthony Cataldo, Hyundai Maps Flash Entry; Hyundai Electronics
Create Flash Memory Division in the US, 41 ELECTRONIC NEWS No. 2069, June
12, 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Group File, Beyond Two Years [here-
inafter Cataldo, Hyundai Maps Flash Entry].
224. See id.
225. See id. Steve Grossman, former head of AMD's Non-Voltile Memory Di-
vision, was considered a prime factor in establishing AMD as one of the world's
leading flash vendors. See Ismini Scouras & Jonathan Cassell, AMD Takes
Hyundai to Court, 1002 ELECTRONIC BUYERS NEWS, Apr. 15, 1996, available in
1996 WL 9427003.
226. Cataldo, Hyundai Maps Flash Entry, supra note 223, at 1.
227. See Cataldo, Hyundai Proceeds, supra note 218.
228. See supra note 209, 91 25. AMD announced its intention to enter into the
flash memory market in 1988, See Leibowitz, supra note 212 at 18, and an-
nounced its first cost-effective flash memory device 1992, AMD Announces 5.0-
volt Flash Memory Device, BUSINESS WIRE, Apr. 13, 1992, available in LEXIS,
News Group File, Beyond Two Years. In contrast, Hyundai expected to start a
flash memory product division and bring its flash memory products to market in
about sixteen months. See Cataldo, Hyundai Maps Flash Entry, supra note
223.
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In response, AMD filed a complaint in the Superior Court of
Santa Clara County in October 1995 alleging, among other
causes of action, that Hyundai misappropriated AMD's flash
129
memory trade secret information. Unlike more traditional
misappropriation actions,230 there was no direct evidence that
the former AMD employees took any trade secret information
with them, or were using AMD's confidential information at
Hyundai.231 Instead, to prove its case, AMD relied on the
timing of Hyundai's announcement of the creation of its flash
memory division, the subsequent departure of AMD's employ-
ees to work for Hyundai, and Hyundai's short time to bring
its products to market. Essentially, AMD had to convince the
court that, under the circumstances, it is inevitable that the
former AMD employees would use AMD's confidential infor-
mation to make flash memory for Hyundai.232
AMD eventually prevailed in this action and obtained a
preliminary injunction preventing the former AMD employees
form working on certain jobs for Hyundai using the inevitable
disclosure doctrine.233 This case has since settled234 ending the
possibility of an appellate review.235 Although the settlement
resolved the issue of potential disclosure of trade secrets be-
tween AMD and Hyundai in this action, it did nothing to
quell the debate over California's adoption of the doctrine 3
nor did it provide any guidance to other businesses or em-
ployees on how to structure their affairs.
G. Rebirth of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
The inevitable disclosure doctrine addresses the problems
a trade secret owner, such as AMD, face in protecting its con-
fidential information.237 The inevitable disclosure doctrine
allows a plaintiff to prove a misappropriation of trade secrets
229. See supra note 209.
230. See Doubleclick, Inc. v. Henderson, No. 116914/97, 1997 WL 731413
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 7, 1997); DiFronzo, supra note 207, at 46.
231. See supra note 209.
232. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995).
233. See Cataldo, Hyundai Proceeds, supra note 217.
234. See AMD, Hyundai Settle Trade-Secrets Case, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1996.
235. See Perry Viscounty & Michael E. Zahm Jr., Disclose Calls-Courts Bal-
ance Competing Interests in Trade Secrets Cases, S.F. DAILY JOURNAL, July 5,
1996, at 4.
236. See generally McMahon et al., supra note 15.
237. See id.
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by showing that a former employee constitutes a threat to
disclose their confidential information without proving an ac-
companying actual misappropriation. 8
Although the inevitable disclosure doctrine itself is not
novel, there is a resurgence of interest since the Seventh Cir-
cuit's decision of PepsiCo v. Redmond."9 In PepsiCo, the court
applied the Illinois version of the UTSA24° in upholding a dis-
trict court's injunction preventing the defendant from as-
suming his responsibilities at a new job for six months.24' The
court found that the similarities between the defendant's
former and future jobs, together with the defendant's actions
in leaving his former employer, indicated he could not be
trusted to keep his former employer's trade secrets confiden-
tial.24
The defendant in PepsiCo, William Redmond, was a high-
level executive at PepsiCo2 4 3 with responsibility for Pepsi's
North American division business unit for northern Califor-
nia.4 In this capacity, Redmond had access to PepsiCo's con-
fidential information that, if disclosed, would undermine Pep-
siCo's ability to compete in the fiercely competitive beverage
industry.2 4' This information included PepsiCo's annually-
updated "Strategic Plan," outlining the company's goals for
the following three years;2 46 the "Annual Operating Plan,"
containing specific information about PepsiCo's activities for
the upcoming year; the company's pricing structure;211 its
"Attack Plan," detailing what activities PepsiCo would take to
gain market share in a specific region;2 9 and information on
PepsiCo's new product delivery system.2"' PepsiCo viewed
this information as highly confidential 25' because it repre-
238. See Pooley, The Sky is Not Falling, supra note 6, at S31.
239. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1262.
240. See POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS, supra note 52, § 2.03[7] [a].
241. See PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1262.
242. See id. at 1271.
243. See id.
244. See id. at 1264.
245. See id. at 1265.
246. See id. at 1266.
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sented a substantial investment of both time and resources,...
and was not known in the industry.258
During Redmond's employment with PepsiCo, he entered
into employment negotiations with a major competitor in the
beverage industry, the Quaker Oats Company ("Quaker").254
Redmond was recruited by another former PepsiCo employee
working for Quaker who headed the division where Redmond
would work. Quaker offered Redmond a position involving
many of the same duties he performed at PespiCo. 55
Redmond concealed his negotiations with Quaker from his
superiors at PepsiCo, including denying he was even consid-
ering leaving PepsiCo, until after he accepted a job offer, and
delayed two days longer to submit his resignation. Par-
ticularly troubling to the court was the fact that while negoti-
ating with Quaker, Redmond continued to perform his job du-
ties at PepsiCo.257
The PepsiCo court acknowledged that lawsuits alleging
only a threatened misappropriation of trade secrets heighten
the tension between trade secret law's policy of protecting the
standards of commercial morality and the rights of workers to
pursue a livelihood.258 However, the court ultimately con-
cluded that prohibiting a party from undertaking a new en-
deavor for a reasonable period of time is proper if: (1) the em-
ployee has knowledge of the employer's trade secrets; (2) the
new employment involves the same, or substantially similar,
duties or technology as the former employment; and (3) the
employee cannot be trusted to avoid using these trade secrets
in his or her new job. 55 Under the facts of the case, the com-
252. See id. at 1265.
253. See PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1267.




258. See id at 1269.
259. The court explained:
It is not the "general skills and knowledge acquired during his tenure
with" [the former employer] that [the former employer] seeks to keep
from falling into [the new employer's] hands, but rather "the particu-
larized plans or processes . . . disclosed to him while the employer-
employee relationship existed, which are unknown to others in the in-
dustry and which give the employer an advantage over his competi-
tors."
PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1272. (quoting AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199
(7th Cir. 1987)).
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bination of Redmond's knowledge of PepsiCo's trade secrets,
the similarities between his position with PepsiCo andQuaker Oats, and his behavior surrounding his departure
from PepsiCo, warranted issuing an injunction.26 °
Since its rebirth in PepsiCo, the inevitable disclosure doc-
trine has received mixed reviews. Litigants have obtained
injunctions where a party uses confidential information for
purposes other than those for which it was disclosed,26' when
an employee stockpiles confidential information immediately
prior to leaving the job,262 when a party's new undertaking
cannot be accomplished without using another's confidential
information, when the likelihood of misappropriation and
subsequent harm substantially outweighs the effects of an
injunction,264 and when the defendant's own activities demon-
strate an inability to retain the secrecy.2 5 In contrast, courts
refused to grant injunctions in cases where subsequent activi-
ties did not involve the subject matter of the confidential in-
formation,2 6 where the information lost its value as a secret, 7
where the grant of an injunction would effectively preclude a
person from employment,2 and where the injunction would
provide a greater remedy than allowed by the governing
law.26 9 In all of these cases, the courts balanced the policy of
protecting the confidential information against the policy of
allowing individuals to pursue gainful employment.'
260. Id.
261. See Southwestern Energy Co. v. Eickenhorst, 955 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D.
Ark. 1997).
262. See Ackerman v. Kimball Int'l, Inc., 652 N.E.2d 507 (Ind. 1995).
263. See La Calhene, Inc. v. Spolyar, 938 F. Supp. 523 (W.D. Wis. 1996);
Neveux v. Webcraft Tech., Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1568 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Uncle B's
Bakery, Inc. v. O'Rourke, 920 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Lumex, Inc. v.
Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
264. See Branson Ultrasonics Corp. v. Stratman, 921 F. Supp. 909 (D. Conn.
1996); Lumex, 919 F. Supp. at 624.
265. See Merck & Co., Inc. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
266. See Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Lockhart, 5 F. Supp. 2d 667 (S.D. Ind.
1998); APAC Teleservices, Inc. v. McRae, 985 F. Supp. 852 (N.D. Iowa 1997).
267. See Campbell Soup Co. v. Giles, 47 F.3d 467 (1st Cir. 1995); Glaxo Inc. v.
Novopharm Ltd., 931 F. Supp. 1280 (E.D.N.C. 1996); FMC Corp. v. Cyprus
Foote Mineral Co., 899 F. Supp. 1477 (W.D.N.C. 1995).
268. See FMC Corp., 899 F. Supp. at 1477.
269. See Multiform Desiccants v. Sullivan, No. 95-CV-0283E(F), 1996 WL
107102 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 1996).
270. See Litton Systems, Inc. v. Sundstrand Corp., 750 F.2d 952, 960 (Fed.
Cir. 1984); see also Robinson v. Jardine Ins. Brokers Int'l Ltd., 856 F. Supp. 554,
559 n.20 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
1198 [Vol. 40
20001 KEEPING EMPLOYEE CONFIDENCE
H. California's Adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure
Doctrine
In 1999, the California Court of Appeal for the Second
District expressly adopted the inevitable disclosure doctrine
in Electro Optical Industries, Inc. v. White. 7' This was the
first California jurisdiction to allow a trade secret owner to
use the inevitable disclosure doctrine as a basis for proving a
trade secret misappropriation, even though courts in other ju-
risdictions applying California law and some superior courts
in California had found inevitable disclosure doctrine was
recognized under the CTSA.27'
The defendant in Electro Optical, Stephen White, was a
sales manager for Electro Optical Industries ("EOI").7" EOI
is one of only three to six companies worldwide that manufac-
tured and sell infrared test equipment.274 White held his posi-
tion at EOI for about fifteen years and was a key sales contact
between EOI and its customers. He knew EOI production
costs, customer lists, marketing plans and financial matters,
and, though not an engineer, had acquired technical informa-
tion about the design and manufacture of EOI's current and
future products.27'
In April 1999, White answered a newspaper advertise-
ment for a position as a sales manager at Santa Barbara In-
frared, Inc. ("SBI"), a competitor of EOI. 76 SBI hired White to
create a list of potential customers for SBI and to develop a
profile of SBI's competitors, specifically outlining their
strength and weaknesses.'77
At the time of White's resignation, EOI filed a complaint
contending that White would inevitably disclose EOI's confi-
dential information in his new job at SBI. EOI alleged
271. Electro Optical Indus., Inc. v. White, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680 (Ct. App.
1999), ordered not to be officially published by Electro Optical Indus., Inc. v.
White, 2000 Cal. LEXIS 3536 (Apr. 12, 2000).
272. See Surgidev Corp., v. Eye Tech., Inc., 648 F. Supp. 661, 679 (D. Minn.
1986); Viscounty & Zahm, supra note 236.




277. See Electro Optical Indus., Inc. v. White, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680, 682 (Ct.
App. 1999), ordered not to be officially published by Electro Optical Indus., Inc.
v. White, 2000 Cal. LEXIS 3536 (Apr. 12, 2000).
278. See id.
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White would rely on EOI's non-technical trade secrets, in-
cluding EOI's customer list, customer requirements, produc-
tion costs, sales prices, sales volume, and marketing plans in
making SBI more competitive." 9 Additionally, EOI believed
White's new job would require him to use his technical
knowledge of EOI's products', including information about
existing and future designs, production methods, materials,
processes, and patent applications.28 °
The appellate court affirmed the lower court's denial of
EOI's request for an injunction on two grounds. First, much
of the information that EOI alleged was threatened by
White's new job either did not constitute a trade secret or was
not threatened by White's action.28 ' EOI's customer list did
not qualify as a trade secret because there were only ap-
proximately 100 entities worldwide that purchased infrared
test equipment2 2 and it would not be difficult to learn their
identities. 83 Further, EOI's production costs and technical in-
formation, although confidential, were irrelevant in this ac-
tion. EOI did not show that SBI could use this information or
that White had the ability to disclose it.284
Second, EOI had not proven that it would suffer the req-
uisite degree of harm if the injunction was not issued. 85 In
balancing the respective harm to each party, the court found
that White would be unemployed for a period of time if the
injunction was granted, but there was no evidence EOI would
suffer any harm if the injunction was withheld.288 EOI and
SBI compete for sales on only one-third of their products. 87
In the instances where they do compete, the competition is
based on the technology of the equipment, not its price, and
the price of the equipment was not a trade secret.288
279. See id.
280. See id.
281. See id. at 685-87.
282. See id. at 682.
283. See Electro Optical Indus., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 685 ("A customer list may
be considered a trade secret where the identity of customers itself has economic
value.").
284. See id.





20001 KEEPING EMPLOYEE CONFIDENCE
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
While the court in Electro Optical has answered the
question of whether California will recognize the inevitable
disclosure doctrine, in at least in the view of one appellate ju-
risdiction, the question still remains whether California
courts will continue to recognize this doctrine and, if so, how
it should be applied. Some commentators view the inevitable
disclosure doctrine as a boon to the ability of businesses to
protect confidential information.289 It aids the trade secret
owner to proactively protect its confidential information be-
fore the information is disclosed.29 ° However, opponents as-
sert that the doctrine's harmful effects, particularly restrict-
ing employees from freely changing jobs, outweighs its
value.29' Opponents cite studies of the business history of
California's Silicon Valley that tie the technological and eco-
nomic success of this region to California's strong policy of
protecting an employee's right to change jobs.292 Therefore,
any doctrine inhibiting the continuation of employee move-
ment may have undesirable effects.9
To answer the question of whether California courts
should apply the doctrine in trade secret misappropriation ac-
tions requires first understanding the scope and purpose of
the inevitable disclosure doctrine. Once the doctrine's scope
and purpose and placed in context, the doctrine must be com-
pared to the CTSA as presently enforced to determine, at
least analytically, if it is compatible with California law. Fi-
nally, the concerns regarding its implementation must be ad-
dressed to determine whether they justify abandoning it.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Function of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
The debate over the inevitable disclosure doctrine has
largely overlooked the doctrine itself and focused solely on its
effect.294 This is most likely attributable to the PepsiCo
289. Electro Optical Indus., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 686.
290. See McMahon et al., supra note 15, at C35.
291. See Susan Street Whaley, The Inevitable Disaster of Inevitable Disclo-
sure, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 809 (1999); see also Matheson, supra note 17.
292. See SAXENIAN, supra note 92, at 25.
293. See Whaley, supra note 291.
294. See Pooley, The Sky is Not Falling, supra note 6, at S31.
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court's definition of the doctrine. The PepsiCo court stated
that the inevitable disclosure doctrine "permits a former em-
ployer to enjoin an employee from working for a direct com-
petitor where the new employment will lead [the employee] to
rely on the [former employer's] trade secrets." '295 Thus, a
business's ability to obtain an injunction effectively "trans-
forms employee access to trade secrets into a de facto non-
competition agreement."
296
However, looking at the doctrine's effect confuses its out-
come with its application.2 97 The CTSA authorizes California
courts to issue an injunction if a trade secret owner proves ei-
ther the "[a]ctual or threatened misappropriation" of its trade
secret.298 Under the CTSA, both an actual and a threatened
misappropriation can be proven by showing that a defendant
used "improper means" to acquire or attempt to acquire confi-
dential information.299 The CTSA then defines improper
means as any conduct that, although otherwise lawful, is im-
proper under the circumstances."' Because a misappropria-
tion of trade secrets is based on the acquiring party's use of
improper means in obtaining the confidential information, re-
quiring that a trade secret owner prove a misappropriation by
direct evidence of actual use, or actual possession of a trade
secret,3°' seemingly misstates California law."2
The inevitable disclosure doctrine is simply a means of
analysis in a trade secret misappropriation action."0 It allows
the trade secret owner to present evidence of the defendant's
own wrongful conduct to prove that the defendant cannot be
trusted to maintain the confidential nature of trade secret in-
formation in a subsequent job. In essence, the doctrine func-
tions like a party opponent admission.0 4 The doctrine allows
a plaintiff to present evidence of the defendant's voluntary
acts to refute an express or implied claim that the defendant
295. Weiss & Lincoln, Accepting the Inevitable, supra note 11, at S6.
296. Matheson, supra note 17 at C35.
297. See Pooley, The Sky is Not Falling, supra note 6, at S31.
298. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.2(a) (West 1999).
299. Id. § 3426.1(b)(1).
300. See id. § 3426.1 cmt.; see E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher,
431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970).
301. See DiFronzo, supra note 207, at 46.
302. See Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1119
(N.D. Cal. 1999).
303. See Pooley, The Sky is Not Falling, supra note 6, at S31.
304. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1220 (West 1999).
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can be trusted to maintain the integrity of the trade secret in-
formation."' Allowing this type of evidence furthers trade se-
cret law's policy of promoting a standard of commercial mo-
rality by holding former employees who act improperly
accountable for their actions." 6
Additionally, the inevitable disclosure doctrine estab-
lishes the burden of proof that the trade secret owner must
overcome to get an injunction.0 7 The trade secret holder must
prove the defendant's conduct inevitably leads to the conclu-
sion it would be impossible for the employee not to disclose
the former employer's trade secrets in the employee's new
job.08 Viewed in this manner the inevitable disclosure doc-
trine does not alter the showing for a misappropriation cur-
rently required by the courts. The doctrine simply expands
the type of evidence a judge may consider in determining if a
misappropriation has taken place.
B. The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine is Consistent with the
California Trade Secret Law
The inevitable disclosure doctrine adopted by the Electro
Optical court is not inconsistent with either the current in-
terpretation, or the public policy underlying the CTSA. The
inevitable disclosure doctrine does not alter the proof re-
quired for a trade secret misappropriation action or the stan-
dard to obtain an injunction.0 9 It addresses only the type of
evidence a trade secret owner may introduce to prove a mis-
appropriation.310
1. Requirements for a Threatened Misappropriation
Under the CTSA
Misappropriation under the CTSA requires a trade secret
owner to prove (1) that a trade secret exists, and (2) that it
was wrongfully used or disclosed, or that such wrongful use
305. See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EVIDENCE § 801 (7th ed. 1996).
306. See supra Part II.C.l.b.
307. See Electro Optical Indus., Inc. v. White, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680, 684 (Ct.
App. 1999), ordered not to be officially published by Electro Optical Indus., Inc.
v. White, 2000 Cal. LEXIS 3536 (Apr. 12, 2000).
308. See id.
309. See Pooley, The Sky is Not Falling, supra note 6, at S31.
310. See id.
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or disclosure is threatened.31' The inevitable disclosure doc-
trine relates only to the second requirement of a misappro-
priation action: the threatened use of a trade secret.312 In a
misappropriation action relying on the inevitable disclosure
doctrine, the trade secret owner must still prove the existence
of a protectable trade secret plus, the trade secret owner must
prove three additional elements. First, the former employee
must know of the business's trade secrets as a result of his or
her employment.31 Second, the trade secret owner must show
that its former employee is taking a job with a competitor
that entails duties sufficiently parallel to his or her former job
that it would be almost impossible for the employee not to re-
fer to the former employer's trade secrets. 1' Third, the trade
secret owner must show that the former employee cannot be
trusted to keep the information confidential in his or her new
position."5
a. The Plaintiff Must Possess a Protectable Trade
Secret
To sustain an action for misappropriation, the trade se-
cret holder must first prove the existence of a protectable
trade secret."6 Although the UTSA definition of a trade se-
cret effectively protects all information used in a business,"7
defining a trade secret for a misappropriation action is more
difficult.1 8 Trade secrets for litigation purposes are, by their
nature, not defined by a neutral party like other intellectual
property."9 They are identified in a contested proceeding, be-
tween two competing interests and by a judge who has to bal-
ance the policy of trade secret law and the interest of the
311. See CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 3426.1-3426.2(a) (West 1999); Bayer Corp. v.
Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
312. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995);
Pooley, The Sky is Not Falling, supra note 6, at S31.
313. See D. Peter Harvey, "Inevitable" Trade Secret Misappropriation After
PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, in LITIGATING COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARK & UNFAIR
COMPETITION CASES FOR THE EXPERIENCED PRACTITIONER 1998, at 199, 214
(PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property Course Handbook
Series No. 537, 1998).
314. See id.
315. See id.
316. See supra Part II.C.1.
317. See supra Part II.C.l.a.




trade secret owner, against the employee's right to change
jobs.3 2' Depending on the interest of the parties involved, a
judge may require the trade secret owner provide a very spe-
cific definition.32'
In cases where the plaintiff relied on the inevitable dis-
closure doctrine the court has required a very stringent stan-
dard of particularity when defining a trade secret.322 Unlike
an actual misappropriation action in which the defendant has
taken specific information, a defendant in an inevitable dis-
closure action generally retains the former employer's trade
secrets only in his or her memory.323 Because of the amor-
phous nature of this information, the court must guard
against a trade secret owner claiming information properly
classified as an employee's general skill and knowledge as the
employer's confidential information.324
For example, the defendant in PepsiCo knew PepsiCo's
confidential pricing information for its new line of sports
drinks which were going to compete directly with Quaker's
sports drinks.2 5 This information would allow Quaker to
strategically price their products in a competitive market to
under-price PepsiCo's."' This price information was time-
sensitive, and any value would evaporate when PepsiCo
launched its new product line.327 This particularized informa-
tion identified by PepsiCo showed the court that PepsiCo was
only trying to protect its confidential information for a limited
period of time and not attempting to prevent Redmond from
taking his general skill and knowledge to his new job. 2'
The trade secret owner in Electro Optical failed to spe-
cifically identify its non-technical trade secrets that therefore
320. See id.
321. See id. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39
cmt. d (1993).
322. See Pooley, Property or Confidentiality?, supra note 125, at C24. This
flexible standard is supported by language in the California Code of Civil Proce-
dure Section 2019 that uses a reasonableness standard in determining whether
trade secrets have been sufficiently identified. See CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 2019
(West 1999).
323. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1270 (7th Cir. 1995).
324. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION. § 39 cmt. d.
325. See PepsiCo, Inc., 54 F.3d at 1270.
326. See id.
327. See id.
328. See id. at 1269.
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precluded such information from protection.329 EOI identified
very broad categories of its non-technical confidential infor-
mation in an attempt to protect as much information as pos-
sible. ° However, much of the information EOI identified ei-
ther did not qualify as a trade secret because it was
commonly known within the industry, or could not be ex-
ploited by SBI. 31 EOI's failure to specifically identify par-
ticular trade secret information as PepsiCo did in PepsiCo
precluded EOI from proving its information was protect-
able.332
b. The Defendant Must Know the Plaintiffs Trade
Secrets
After the trade secret owner proves the existence of a
protectable trade secret under the inevitable disclosure doc-
trine, the trade secret owner must show that its former em-
ployee knows the trade secret information.3 This require-
ment actually entails the trade secret owner proving three
separate points: (1) that the employee knows the plaintiffs
trade secret(s); (2) that the employee has the ability to trans-
fer this information to a competitor in a manner the competi-
tor could make use of it;3 4 and (3) that the new employer
could use the information.335
These three points are consistent with the CTSA 3 6 The
CTSA does not provide a remedy for every disclosure of trade
secret information.3 7 It prohibits a disclosure of information
only if the disclosure impairs the commercial value of the
trade secret information. 38 To allow a broader reading would
329. See Electro Optical Indus., Inc. v. White, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680, 685 (Ct.
App. 1999), ordered not to be officially published by Electro Optical Indus., Inc.
v. White, 2000 Cal. LEXIS 3536 (Apr. 12, 2000).
330. See id. at 683.
331. See id. at 685; see also ECT Int'l, Inc. v Zwerlein, 597 N.W.2d 479 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1999) (finding that the plaintiff failed to identify a protectable trade
secret when it identified different software components but failed to specify
which components were misappropriated).
332. Electro Optical Indus., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 685.
333. See Harvey, supra note 313, at 214.
334. See Electro Optical Indus., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 680.
335. See Gibson-Homans Co. v. Wall-Tite, Inc., No. 92 2750 JGD, 1992 WL
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misstate the meaning of the statute39 and violate California's
policy of worker mobility."'
This requirement's compatibility with the CTSA is fur-
ther demonstrated by comparing the analyses in PepsiCo and
Electro Optical. In PepsiCo, the defendant was the general
manager of a regional business unit of PepsiCo.341' The defen-
dant knew the pricing information for PepsiCo's new product
line, had the training to transfer this information to Quaker,
and Quaker could use this information to set its prices in
markets where it competed with PespiCo.342 By contrast, in
Electro Optical, EOI claimed White's new job at SBI threat-
ened its technical trade secrets .' 4 E0I believed White would
pass on information regarding "existing and future product
designs, production methods, materials and processes, and
the status of EOI's patent applications."3 4 However, the court
found that unlike Redmond, White (who was a sales man-
ager) lacked the technical training to transfer the information
to SBI, or that SBI could use the information if it could be
transferred. 345  Thus, unlike a traditional misappropriation
action where the trade secret owner can prove the defendant
knew and could transfer the confidential information by
showing the defendant actually possessed the trade secret in-
formation by documentary evidence, under the inevitable dis-
closure doctrine the trade secret owner must still make the
same showing without benefit of such direct evidence. This
requirement sets a high bar for the trade secret owner to
meet, remaining consistent with the CTSA.
c. The Defendant Must Be Taking a Job So Similar
He or She Would Be Forced to Rely on the Trade
Secret
The inevitable disclosure doctrine also requires the trade
secret owner to prove the former employee is taking a job
with a competitor that is so similar to the employee's present
339. See id.
340. See Continental Car-Na-Var Corp. v. Moseley, 148 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1944).
341. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1263 (7th Cir. 1995).
342. See id.
343. See Electro Optical Indus., Inc. v. White, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680, 685 (Ct.
App. 1999), ordered not to be officially published by Electro Optical Indus., Inc.
v. White, 2000 Cal. LEXIS 3536 (Apr. 12, 2000).
344. Id. at 683.
345. See id. at 685.
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job that the employee will be forced to rely on the former em-
ployer's trade secrets.146 This requirement embodies the con-
clusion that some situations present "[tihe virtual impossibil-
ity of [the employee] performing all of his prospective duties
for [the new employer] to the best of his ability, without in ef-
fect giving it the benefit of [the plaintiffs] confidential infor-
mation." '47 These situations make the issuance of an injunc-
tion against disclosure and use of this information
inadequate. 48
This requirement is also consistent with the CTSA. It
follows and expands California's requirement that the new
employer have the capability to exploit the former employer's
trade secret information.349 The trade secret owner must
show not just that the new employer can use the trade secret
information, but also the new employer's method of operation
is so analogous that the employee cannot avoid using the
trade secret information. 5 '
The PepsiCo court illustrated just how similar the former
and new jobs must be for the inevitable disclosure doctrine to
apply. While Redmond worked for PepsiCo, part of his job en-
tailed overseeing the operation of a new million-dollar prod-
uct delivery system PepsiCo was testing in California.351
Redmond's primary responsibility at Quaker would be to es-
tablish a new product delivery system for Quaker's prod-
ucts. 3 1 Contrary to Quaker's assertions that Redmond would
be simply implementing a delivery system from a pre-existing
plan, the court found that Redmond would have a substantial
role in both its design and development.353
That this requirement is in accord with the CTSA is illus-
trated by contrasting PepsiCo with another California case,
Gibson-Homans Co. v. Wall-Tite, Inc.54 In Gibson-Homans,
346. See PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1270.
347. Air Prod & Chems., Inc. v. Johnson, 442 A.2d 1114, 1124 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1982).
348. See id.
349. See supra Part II.D.
350. See Gibson-Homans Co. v. Wall-Tite, Inc., No. 92-2750-JGD, 1992 WL
512411, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 1992).
351. See PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1266.
352. See id.
353. See id.
354. Gibson-Homans, 1992 WL 512411, at *1. Although Gibson-Homans in-
volved an actual misappropriation of trade secrets, it is still valuable for com-
parison purposes.
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the trade secret owner and the allegedly infringing company
both directly competed in the adhesive market.355 The alleg-
edly infringing company, Wall-Tite, was founded by a former
Gibson-Homans employee who created many of the adhesive
compounds Gibson-Homans sold.356  When Wall-Tite was
started, the Gibson-Homans employee took a written copy of
the formulas for these adhesive compounds with him.357 How-
ever, even though the employee's position with Gibson-
Homans and his position with Wall-Tite were seemingly iden-
tical, the court concluded that he had not misappropriated
these trade secrets because of the differences in the two com-
panies' operations.58 Gibson-Homans actually manufactured
the adhesives it sold while Wall-Tite simply re-branded bulk
adhesives it purchased from outside suppliers. 9 There was
no evidence Wall-Tite's current method of operation, nor any
future plan of operation, would bring the two companies' op-
erations into conflict.36 ° Again, this requirement that the for-
mer employer's and new employer's method of operation be
substantially similar to effectuate a transfer of the confiden-
tial information required by the inevitable disclosure doctrine
protects the balance between the former employer and the
former employee that the CTSA attempts to reach.
d. The Former Employee Cannot Be Trusted to Keep
the Information Confidential
The final requirement that a trade secret owner must
prove in order to use the inevitable disclosure doctrine is that
the former employee cannot be trusted to keep the informa-
tion confidential.361 The doctrine requires a trade secret
owner to present instances of the former employee's and/or a
new employer's improper conduct to demonstrate that they
cannot be trusted to maintain the integrity of a former em-
ployer's trade secrets. 6' The CTSA adopted the improper




358. See id. at *5.
359. See id. at *2.
360. See Gibson-Homans, 1992 WL 512411, at *5.
361. See Harvey, supra note 313, at 214.
362. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1270 (7th Cir. 1995).
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prove a misappropriation of its confidential information.36
The standard states that a misappropriation of trade secrets
may be shown by conduct that is improper under the circum-
stances, although otherwise legal. 64 This standard is consis-
tent with California courts' traditional practice of enjoining a
party's actions if they amount to unfair competition.365
The PepsiCo court showed that isolated instances of
questionable conduct on the part of a former empolyee might
not suffice. The court found Redmond lied to his superiors
and colleagues at PepsiCo on multiple occasions during the
entire time he was being courted by Quaker.366 Additionally,
officials at Quaker also demonstrated a significant lack of
candor during this process. 67 It was this repeated pattern of
questionable actions on the part of both defendants that led
the court to conclude that "[e]ven if Redmond could somehow
refrain from relying on this information, as he promised he
would, his action in leaving [PepsiCo], [Quaker's] actions in
hiring Redmond, and the varying testimony regarding
Redmond's new responsibilities, made Redmond's assurances
to PepsiCo less than comforting." '68 Enjoining the activities of
a defendant that itself calls into doubt its ability to be trusted
with sensitive information is consistent with the CTSA.
2. The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine Does Not Violate
California's Public Policy of Employee Mobility
The inevitable disclosure doctrine does not violate Cali-
fornia's strong public policy of relatively unrestricted worker
mobility.36 The California Supreme Court has characterized
the right of individuals to pursue any calling, business, or
profession a "property right" that equity should protect to the
fullest extent possible.7 This is reflected in section 16600 of
the California Business and Professions Code. 1  Section
16600 prohibits agreements restraining an employee's free-
363. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 3426.1 cmt. (West 1999).
364. See id.; see also supra Part II.C.2.
365. See Scott v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1034, 1043 (N.D. Cal.
1990).
366. See PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1264.
367. See id. at 1270-71.
368. Id. at 1267.
369. See Pooley, The Sky is Not Falling, supra note 6, at S31.
370. See Continental Car-Na-Var Corp. v. Moseley, 148 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1944).
371. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1999).
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dom to change jobs because such restrictions fail to deliver
any corresponding benefit to the employee or to the public. 2
However, section 16600 has never been held a per se exclu-
sion on all agreements or judicial orders that limit an em-
ployee from taking a subsequent job.373
An employee's right to change jobs has always been lim-
ited by the notion of unfair competition.374 For example,
courts have prevented employees from using or disclosing the
employer's trade secrets both during and after their relation-
ship.7 Restricting an employee from specifically defined ac-
tivities may be enforceable if the restriction does not bar the
employee from practicing an entire profession, trade, or busi-
ness."' Additionally, California prohibits a former employee
from soliciting coworkers, or customers of the former em-
ployer. 7
Section 16600 allows a court in a trade secret misappro-
priation proceeding based on the inevitable disclosure doc-
trine to protect California's overarching policy of worker mo-
bility while not undermining the purpose of trade secret
law.7 It allows the judge to presume an employee will be
harmed if the former employer obtains an injunction. This
presumption effectively sets the threshold the trade secret
holder must overcome. The court must still consider all the
facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged threatened
misappropriation and balance the competing harms when de-
termining if an injunction is proper. 9 Only if a court finds
372. See Schmidt v. Foundation Health, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172 (Ct. App. 1995).
373. See Scott v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1034 (N.D. Cal.
1990).
374. See American Credit Indem. Co. v. Sacks, 262 Cal. Rptr. 92, 98-99 (Ct.
App. 1989).
375. See Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731 (Ct. App. 1997) (enjoining
two former employees from (1) doing business with any company that switched
its business to the employees' new business as a result of the employees' use of
the former employer's trade secret information, and (2) soliciting any business
from any entity that did business with the former employer before the employ-
ees stopped working there).
376. See General Commercial Packaging, Inc. v. TPS Packaging Eng'g, Inc.,
114 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 1997); Kolling v. Dow Jones & Co. Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 797
(Ct. App. 1982).
377. See American Credit Indem. Co., 262 Cal. Rptr. at 98; Loral Corp. v.
Moyes, 219 Cal. Rptr. 836 (Ct. App. 1985).
378. See Pooley, The Sky is Not Falling, supra note 6, at S31.
379. See Robinson v. Jardine Ins. Brokers Int'l Ltd., 856 F. Supp. 554 (N.D.
Cal. 1994)
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both that the former employee acted improperly and engaged
in activities constituting unfair competition, and that on bal-
ance the employer will suffer the greater harm, will a court
issue an injunction.38 °
In practice, the inevitable disclosure doctrine functions as
a means of proving a recognized exception to section 16600.31
It allows a trade secret owner to show that the former em-
ployee will inevitably engage in improper acts amounting to
unfair competition. It does not lower the requirements for
proving a misappropriation, or lower the burden the trade se-
cret owner must overcome. Thus, the inevitable disclosure
doctrine is not inconsistent with the public policy favoring
relatively unrestricted employee mobility.
V. PROPOSAL
As long as businesses rely on confidential information to
maintain competitive positions relative to their competitors,
the competitors will seek ways to gain access to this informa-
tion. The inevitable disclosure doctrine provides an effective
tool for California courts to use to ensure that a business's
corner cutting does not cross over into realm of unfair compe-
tition. The doctrine follows trade secret law's historical trend
of changing and adapting to the modern business environ-
ment to make sure the standards of commercial ethics are ef-
fectively enforced. 82 Further, it allows the owner of trade se-
cret information to prevent its unauthorized disclosure while
still protecting the rights of the employee to market his or her
skills. The balancing of these interests are central to Califor-
nia's trade secret law.
While California's Second District Court of Appeal in
Electro Optical has been de-published, the decisions was in-
adequate to quell the debate over the inevitable disclosure
doctrine had it stood. The Electro Optical court failed to iden-
tify exactly what California courts will require before issuing
an injunction under the inevitable disclosure doctrine.383 This
380. See Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 856 F.2d 1384, 1388 (9th Cir.
1988).
381. See supra Part II.E.
382. See supra Part II.A.
383. See Electro Optical Indus., Inc. v. White, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680 (Ct. App.
1999), ordered not to be officially published by Electro Optical Indus., Inc. v.
White, 2000 Cal. LEXIS 3536 (Apr. 12, 2000).
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court dealt only with the denial of an injunction based on
failure of the trade secret owner to specifically identify its
confidential information and to demonstrate that any confi-
dential information was sufficiently threatened to warrant
the injunction.' Courts will certainly be confronted with this
issue again."' Future appellate decisions should clearly de-
lineate the requirements for a threatened misappropriation,
be it adopting the PepsiCo test in its entirety, or altering it
specifically for California. California courts should follow the
Electro Optical court's lead by approving the inevitable dis-
closure doctrine and further the effectiveness of trade secret
law by providing a clear test for both businesses and employ-
ees to follow.386
VI. CONCLUSION
The inevitable disclosure doctrine, as discussed by the
Electro Optical court, is compatible with current California
Law. As one commentator stated:
The inevitable disclosure doctrine does not offer relief
merely because an employee joins a competitor. It does
not stand for the proposition, and should not be used to
advocate that an employee can be prevented from joining a
competitor simply because the employee will be working in
similar capacity for his or her new employer. 7
The doctrine's application is limited to situations where for-
mer employees themselves have shown they cannot be
trusted 88 and then only when it is inevitable they will engage
in conduct amounting to unfair competition."9 In the end, the
doctrine merely incorporates the notion that people's actions
speak louder than their words into trade secret law. Further
it moves California closer to meeting its obligation to enforce
the CTSA consistently with other states' trade secret laws."'
Prior to the adoption of the inevitable disclosure doctrine
a trade secret owner, such as AMD, were severely hampered
384. See id.
385. See Weiss & Lincoln, Accepting the Inevitable, supra note 11, at S6.
386. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.8 (West 1999).
387. Michael R Levinson and Timothy J. Gerend, New US Doctrine Aids in
Trade Secrets, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CENTER (JULY/AUG. 1998).
388. See Pooley, The Sky is Not Falling, supra note 6, at S31.
389. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 39 cmt. a (1993).
390. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 3426.8 (West 1999).
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in proving a misappropriation.39' AMD was unable to prove
an actual misappropriation of its trade secrets even though
the facts surrounding their employees departures raised
questions about the proprietary of Hyundai's actions. But the
consequences of a misappropriation for companies in AMD's
situation are the same whether the misappropriation oc-
curred as the result of an actual theft or an unconscious
use.392 At best, the trade secret owner can recover the infor-
mation, suffering only the diminution of value for the time it
was used by a competitor.9  At worst, the trade secret can be
lost forever, since once the information is disclosed "like gas
released from a container, the secret disperses immediately
into the 'public domain,' from which it cannot be recalled. 3 94
Such strict consequences, regardless of the attendant circum-
stances, make the use of circumstantial evidence to prove a
misappropriation the more reasoned interpretation of trade
secret law.395
AMD was able to prove that its trade secrets were
threatened and obtained an injunction by relying on the in-
evitable disclosure doctrine.396 However, California's move
toward adopting the doctrine does not mean the floodgates
will be opened to this type of claim in the future.97 Section
16600 of the California Business and Profession Code and
California's policy favoring worker mobility will both work to-
gether to limit the application of the inevitable disclosure doc-
trine. 98 The doctrine will not prevent companies like Hyun-
dai from spending "whatever they have to in order to win in
[a] business. ""' The inevitable disclosure doctrine simply
prevents companies from improperly free-riding on the efforts
of others.
391. See supra Part II.C.2.
392. See James Pooley, Is Nothing Secret, THE RECORDER (1996).
393. See id.
394. Id.
395. See Electro Optical Indus., Inc. v. White, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680, 684 (Ct.
App. 1999), ordered not to be officially published by Electro Optical Indus., Inc.
v. White, 2000 Cal. LEXIS 3536 (Apr. 12, 2000).
396. See Viscounty &. Zahn, supra note 235.
397. See Pooley, The Sky is Not Falling, supra note 6, at S31.
398. See id.
399. Cataldo, Hyundai Maps Flash Entry, supra note 223.
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